
Cnet published an alarming story today
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10446503-38.html
Anyone with an e-mail account likely knows that police can peek inside it if they have a paper search warrant.
But cybercrime investigators are frustrated by the speed of traditional methods of faxing, mailing, or e-mailing companies these documents. They're pushing for the creation of a national Web interface linking police computers with those of Internet and e-mail providers so requests can be sent and received electronically.
We used to make fun of the East Germans and the KGB for snooping on phone calls.
What is going on now makes the KGB look like pikers.
But the most controversial element is probably the private Web interface, which raises novel security and privacy concerns, especially in the wake of a recent inspector general's report (PDF) from the Justice Department. The 289-page report detailed how the FBI obtained Americans' telephone records by citing nonexistent emergencies and simply asking for the data or writing phone numbers on a sticky note rather than following procedures required by law.
Some companies already have police-only Web interfaces. Sprint Nextel operates what it calls the L-Site, also known as the "legal compliance secure Web portal." The company even has offered a course that "will teach you how to create and track legal demands through L-site. Learn to navigate and securely download requested records." Cox Communications makes its price list for complying with police requests public; a 30-day wiretap is $3,500.
Oh brother.
In the interest of open source information disclosure and civil liberties, John Threat and I have been discussing this today, did a little web-sleuting, and found some interesting background. I'm certain he's going to have some editorial about Dragnet soon, too.
The main web interface appears to be located at https://l-site.sprint.com/
https://l-site.sprint.com/eSiteWeb - ip address is 144.230.164.22
Traceroute to the host ends at 65.166.248.10
which appears to be a network leased by the US Govt from Sprint
Sprint SPRINTLINK-2-BLKS (NET-65-160-0-0-1)
65.160.0.0 - 65.174.255.255
US COURTS - DCN - COLOCATION - FON-110146151297967 (NET-65-166-248-8-1)
65.166.248.8 - 65.166.248.15
Attempting to use traceroute to find the path this system is abruptly blocked by the host at 65.166.248.10 - who owns that network?
OrgName: US COURTS - DCN - COLOCATION -
OrgID: UCDC-1
Address: 13221 WOODLAND PARK RD.
City: HERNDON
StateProv: VA
PostalCode: 20171
Country: US
NetRange: 65.166.248.8 - 65.166.248.15
CIDR: 65.166.248.8/29
NetName: FON-110146151297967
NetHandle: NET-65-166-248-8-1
Parent: NET-65-160-0-0-1
NetType: Reassigned
Comment:
RegDate: 2002-03-29
Updated: 2002-03-29
I'm not implying that there is funny business going on here, but this begs a question and raises concerns... Why are US Courts (http://www.uscourts.gov) networks being used to either filter traffic to or host Sprints legal compliance site? Who has access to the systems and databases, and what controls are in place to prevent abuse? Where are the Sprint systems, who administrates them, and who has physical access to them and their backups? And what controls are in place for their main caller database?
As a white-hat hacker who has performed hundreds of penetration tests, I am very, very concerned for the security and privacy of all this personal data.
In December of last year, Wired published an article that demonstrated evidence that there should be concern:
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/12/gps-data contains a lot of background info.
The recent "Google Hack" also gives reason for pause:
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9144221/Google_attack_part_of_widespread_spying_effort
Drummond said that the hackers never got into Gmail accounts via the Google hack, but they did manage to get some "account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line."
That's because they apparently were able to access a system used to help Google comply with search warrants by providing data on Google users, said a source familiar with the situation, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak with the press. "Right before Christmas, it was, 'Holy s***, this malware is accessing the internal intercept [systems],'" he said.
The Nation further reports:
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20100215/sanchez
The Google hackers are scarcely the first to exploit such security holes. In the summer of 2004, unknown intruders managed to activate wiretapping software embedded in the systems of Greece's largest cellular carrier. For ten months, the hackers eavesdropped on the cellphone calls of more than 100 prominent citizens--including the prime minister, opposition members of parliament, and high cabinet officials.
The writer Julian Sanchez (blog at http://www.juliansanchez.com/) makes the case:
n a way, the hackers' strategy makes perfect sense. Communications networks are generally designed to restrict outside access to their users' private information. But the goal of government surveillance is to create a breach-by-design, a deliberate backdoor into otherwise carefully secured systems. The appeal to an intruder is obvious: Why waste time with retail hacking of many individual targets when you can break into the network itself and spy wholesale?
and goes on to describe the troubles DCSNET has had
Consider the FBI's Digital Collection System Network, or DCSNet. Via a set of dedicated, encrypted lines plugged directly into the nation's telecom hubs, DCSNet is designed to allow authorized law enforcement agents to initiate a wiretap or gather information with point-and-click simplicity. Yet a 2003 internal audit, released several years later under a freedom-of-information request, found a slew of problems in the system's setup that appalled security experts. Designed with external threats in mind, it had few safeguards against an attack assisted by a Robert Hanssen-style accomplice on the inside. We can hope those problems have been resolved by now. But if new vulnerabilities are routinely discovered in programs used by millions, there's little reason to hope that bespoke spying software can be rendered airtight.
Also, it brings to mind the INSLAW / PROMIS scandal.
We owe Christopher Soghoian a debt of gratitude for attending the ISS World conference and breaking this news in the first place last year. Chris deleted the files he posted at his blog at the request of the conference, but fortunately the EFF mirrored them. www.eff.org/files/soghoian-surveillance-dump.zip
This post of his http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2009/12/8-million-reasons-for-real-surveillance.html is definitely worth checking out.
The first evidence on the web for the Sprint system is from 2007 at the same conference: http://www.telestrategies.com/ISS_MAY07/ISSWorldMay07.pdf
*UPDATE*
And then there was this...
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/03/AR2010020304057_pf.html
Google to enlist NSA to help it ward off cyberattacks
Under an agreement that is still being finalized, the National Security Agency would help Google analyze a major corporate espionage attack that the firm said originated in China and targeted its computer networks, according to cybersecurity experts familiar with the matter. The objective is to better defend Google -- and its users -- from future attack.
Google and the NSA declined to comment on the partnership. But sources with knowledge of the arrangement, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the alliance is being designed to allow the two organizations to share critical information without violating Google's policies or laws that protect the privacy of Americans' online communications. The sources said the deal does not mean the NSA will be viewing users' searches or e-mail accounts or that Google will be sharing proprietary data.
Tinfoil hat scenario: The Google hack was a NSA false flag operation, as wikipedia describes, "covert operations which are designed to deceive the public in such a way that the operations appear as though they are being carried out by other entities." Then, they offer to "help" Google. Far fetched, maybe, but there is precedence: the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the pretext President Johnson used to initiate hostility with the North Vietnamese.
How to protect yourself:
- Instant Messenger communications using Off the Record- at the bottom of the page are chat programs and plugins that support it.
- Encrypt email using GPG
- Use TOR a free distributed proxy network. Torbutton is an easy to use plugin for Firefox.
- If you want it to be secret, don't store or transmit it electronically using phones, text messaging, email
- Pay as you go sim cards for cellphones, such as ATT GOPHONE and TRACFONE, purchased with cash and without revealing your SSN.
I have a few other things on my plate to take care of first, and haven't checked out the zipfile from eff.org yet, so more detail will come later...